Somatization in survivors of catastrophic trauma: a methodological review. by North, Carol S
Introduction to Somatization
Disorder
In healthcare settings, the term somatization
is applied to symptoms without medically
identifiable origins. Some patients with
chronic proliﬁc complaints of such symptoms
receive a psychiatric diagnosis of somatization
disorder. Somatization disorder is deﬁned by
chronic complaints of widespread medically
unexplained symptoms across multiple organ
systems. Diagnosis requires documentation at
some time in the patient’s history (not neces-
sarily simultaneously) of clinically signiﬁcant,
medically unexplained symptoms in four
symptom groups: pain complaints (four
symptoms), gastrointestinal complaints (two
symptoms), pseudoneurological complaints
called conversion symptoms (one symptom),
and complaints referent to sexual or repro-
ductive functions (one symptom). By deﬁni-
tion the onset must be documented to have
occurred before the individual is 30 years of
age to qualify for the diagnosis (1). The con-
dition occurs predominantly in women (1,2),
typically beginning during the decade follow-
ing puberty (3) and persisting for life. One in
every 50 to 100 women in the population
suffers from this disorder (4). Its origins are
partly genetic (1,5): 25% of the first-degree
female relatives of these patients also have
somatization disorder, and their male relatives
have elevated rates of antisocial personality
disorder, criminality, and alcohol problems,
and often a history of physical abusiveness.
Somatization disorder is one of the oldest
psychiatric and medical disorders known to
mankind. Ancient Egypt and classical Greek
and Roman cultures acknowledged the condi-
tion, previously called hysteria, the Latin root
for uterus. The uterus was thought to wander
through the body, provoking an array of phys-
ical symptoms wherever it came to rest. Many
of Freud’s patients had hysteria. In therapy
these patients described extensive histories of
childhood trauma and sexual abuse. At first
Freud assumed hysteria to result from these
traumas, but with a later change of heart he
revised his theories reﬂecting reinterpretation
of his patients’ allegations as fabricated. The
disorder was renamed somatization disorder in
1980 to reflect a revised definition based on
its characteristic multiple, medically unex-
plained symptoms. Of seven psychiatric diag-
noses involving medically unexplained
symptoms defined in the somatoform disor-
ders category of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders-IV (1), somatiza-
tion disorder is the most severe.
Patients with somatization disorders com-
plain not only of somatic symptoms of physi-
cal disorders they do not have but also of
psychological symptoms of psychiatric disor-
ders they do not have, demonstrating the phe-
nomenon is not only somatoform but
psychoform as well (3,6–8). A study in a uni-
versity psychiatry clinic by Lenze and col-
leagues (9) found that patients with
somatization disorder complained of more
depressive symptoms than patients from the
same clinic who had major depression, as
many manic symptoms as clinic patients with
bipolar disorder, as many anxiety symptoms as
anxiety disorder patients, and as many
psychotic symptoms as those with schizophre-
nia. Thus, patients with somatization disorder
can be described as complaining that every-
thing is wrong, both physical and mental. The
volumes of symptom complaints from these
patients prompts diagnosis of an abundance of
additional psychiatric diagnoses (8,10–12).
Therefore, clinician vigilance is important to
detect somatization disorder whose psy-
chopathology mimics other psychiatric disor-
ders. Somatization disorder is present in about
10% of psychiatric patients and hospitalized
medical and surgical populations (13,14).
In both clinical and research settings, the
problem with trying to establish a diagnosis
of somatization disorder is that the syndrome
does not present in a straightforward manner.
Somatization disorder is usually overlooked
in both clinical and research settings (15–17),
partly because of failure to factor in the differ-
ential, but also because even when it is con-
sidered, data gathered from the patient
interview alone are often insufﬁcient to estab-
lish the diagnosis (3,18,19). This is because
these patients a) routinely deny symptoms,
even symptoms that were chief complaints
documented in their medical records during
previous visits to healthcare specialists, and
b) offer spurious medical explanations for their
symptoms (18,20). Typically, it is necessary to
obtain the information historically from vari-
ous medical records and/or to observe the
patient over time to collect the range of symp-
tom complaints needed to meet criteria for the
diagnosis (1,18–20). Identiﬁcation of somati-
zation disorder requires the ability to rule out
medically based explanations of symptoms.
Only when medically based etiologies can be
conﬁdently dismissed can symptoms be con-
sidered somatoform, and assessment cannot
proceed without it.
Given these problems with identifying
somatization disorder, it is understandable
that studies relying solely on patient interview
data grossly underestimate the prevalence
(18,19,21,22). In clinical settings, patient
interview studies may underestimate rates of
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somatization disorder by a factor of 20 or
more (23). Even the widely acclaimed
Epidemiologic Catchment Area study identi-
fied only about one-tenth the prevalence of
the disorder estimated for the population by
more comprehensive assessment methods)
(24). Patients with identified somatization
disorder therefore represent only the tip of
the iceberg of the disorder in these popula-
tions. Collecting the extensive clinical docu-
mentation necessary to rule out the diagnosis
is excessively laborious for most clinical and
research endeavors. In ordinary practice the
diagnosis often relies solely on patient report.
Because nondetection of somatization disor-
der by patient interview techniques yields
apparently low case rates in clinical and
research settings, the disorder as formally
deﬁned has been assumed to be rare and non-
applicable for use in various populations (23).
A large reservoir of patients who somatize yet
do not meet criteria for a somatoform disor-
der diagnosis is assumed to describe the
widely recognized presence of medically
unexplained symptoms in the absence of a
detectable somatoform disorder in various
patient populations.
To capture this hypothesized broader
population, alternative methods have been
used to identify somatization. One alternative
involves application of screening tools or
abridged indices of somatization to describe
lesser degrees of the phenomenon, using a
lower threshold or relaxed diagnostic criteria
(22,23,25–28). Studies of patients identiﬁed
by less stringent criteria found them to exhibit
the typical associated features of the full soma-
tization disorder, which researchers inter-
preted as indicating the validity of abridged
methods of ascertainment (22,27,29–31).
However, the characteristic features of somati-
zation disorder in patients with apparent sub-
syndromal somatoform presentations may
simply reﬂect the inclusion of many unrecog-
nized somatization disorder patients in a
mixed group of somatizing patients.
More commonly, somatization has been
conceptualized as a behavior outside the con-
text of diagnosable syndromes (32,33), such as
on a continuum from mild to severe and
chronic (34). It is not clear, however, what the
dimensional construct of somatization repre-
sents in the absence of delineated disorders
that have been validated by conventional
methods established for diagnostic entities.
Ascertainment of symptoms outside the con-
text of diagnosis creates the same difﬁculties
encountered with consideration of medical
symptoms in general outside the context of
medical diagnosis. The problem is illustrated
in medical settings with the symptom of chest
pain and attempts to characterize it and rec-
ommend treatment without consideration of
whether the symptom is due to a heart attack,
pneumonia, a pulmonary embolus, esophageal
erosion or spasm, musculoskeletal injury, or
even a panic attack. Although studying soma-
tization as a dimensional construct rather than
as dichotomous diagnosis requires far less
effort and may improve statistical power, any
potential benefits can actually provide little
real advantage considering problems of valid-
ity of symptom-based data outside the context
of established diagnostic nosology (35).
Somatization in Disaster
Literature
The literature on mental health effects of
catastrophic trauma such as community disas-
ters focuses on posttraumatic stress disorder.
Somatization disorder is not listed among the
classic responses to disaster, nor have other
somatoform disorders been described in this
literature. However, nondiagnostic “somatiza-
tion,” “somatization symptoms,” and “somatic
symptoms” have been abundantly described in
the literature. Failure to differentiate “somatic”
symptoms (referring to any physical symptom
complaint without regard to medical basis)
from “somatoform” symptoms (limited to
physical symptoms without medical basis) is a
signiﬁcant shortcoming of many studies that
use symptom scales such as the Symptom
Checklist-90 (SCL-90). The SCL-90 has been
the most popular symptom scale in postdisas-
ter psychiatric assessment (36). Illustrating this
instrument’s problem with validity, a study
that used the SCL-90-R to assess patients with
brain tumors found that one-half of the brain
tumor patients endorsed somatic symptoms,
leading them to be classiﬁed with a group of
somatizers (37,38).
Symptom scales have numerous additional
methodologic shortcomings when used in
trauma research. Even though the originator
of the SCL-90 clearly stated the scale does not
provide diagnostic information (36), it and
other symptom scales have been used incor-
rectly to identify cases of somatization
through establishment of cutoff points for
caseness. In purely dimensional use, scores are
compared with other variables to show associ-
ations with somatization behavior, a construct
lacking validity outside established nosologic
frameworks. Many instruments in trauma
research measure global distress and fail to dif-
ferentiate somatization from depression and
anxiety (39). Somatization symptom scales are
unable to detect and correct for response sets
and social desirability (40–42), signiﬁcant fea-
tures of the presentation of symptoms among
patients who somatize extensively. Finally,
measurement of somatization in studies of
mental health effects of trauma encounters all
the problems identiﬁed earlier in this chapter
related to studying somatization in other set-
tings, including selective reporting and med-
icalization of symptoms characteristic of
somatizing populations and lack of provisions
to exclude a medical basis for physical symp-
tom complaints.
In most traumatized populations, risk for
traumatic events is confounded with preexist-
ing psychosocial factors. Somatization disor-
der patients, for example, report higher rates
of traumatic events than other people, and
after traumatic events they report more prob-
lems and symptoms than others. To assume
that the problems (including somatization)
observed after the traumatic event are caused
by the traumatic event itself invokes the classic
logical error of post hoc ergo proctor hoc (after
the fact, therefore because of the fact).
Uncertainty about attribution of symptoms is
a particular problem in somatizing popula-
tions due to the well-known suggestibility
characteristic of patients with somatoform dis-
orders, which further complicates the vagaries
of normal recollection. Normal memory links
occurrences with other events as temporal
signposts of memory (e.g., “I remember it
well, because it was the week after my mother
had died, I had a house full of company, and I
went to the emergency room thinking I was
having a heart attack.”). Somatization disorder
patients find events to anchor their many
somatoform symptoms in time.
Somatizing patients are well known for
their suggestibility and unreliability in report-
ing, and attribution of symptoms is subject to
redirection. Causal assumptions may be gen-
erated without basis, for example, after a
traumatic event such as a disaster, when
symptoms may be reattributed to the event.
Careful examination of pre-event history to
document the occurrence of the same symp-
toms and patterns of multiple complaints
prior to the event is necessary to consider
causal associations. Therefore, prospective
data are superior to retrospective data to sort
out causality and directionalities of apparent
associations, particularly when they involve
somatoform complaints. In disaster research,
these deliberations demand two simultaneous
comparisons: a) between exposed and unex-
posed (or less exposed) populations, and
b) pre-event versus postevent status, preferably
in a prospective design. Disaster research,
however, does not lend itself to a prospective,
randomized experimental design because of
the general lack of announcements preceding
such impending events. Thus, the best proxy
is to study populations prior to a disaster and
then compare the postdisaster status of the
exposed to that of the unexposed.
One of the best sources of material for
studying mental health effects of traumatic
events is the setting of major disasters, which
tend to be equal-opportunity events selecting
people randomly. (A notable exception is
ﬂooding, which tends to affect lower-income
populations that settle on ﬂood plains because
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the land is less expensive. These populations
have endemically high rates of psychopathology
independent of disasters). Disaster studies can
therefore sidestep much of the confounding of
preexisting psychopathology with risk for
traumatic events in other populations of
trauma survivors such as victims of assault,
rape, and motor vehicle accidents.
Selection of treatment populations further
compounds the methodological issues in stud-
ies of mental health effects of trauma. People
who seek out treatment are nonrepresentative
of all people with psychiatric disorders; sam-
pling from treatment settings selects for indi-
viduals with severe psychopathology (those
with the most frequent treatment contacts)
and constitutional personality factors, thus
adding further bias to the sample selection.
The above methodological issues are
critical for the interpretation of the literature
on somatization after disasters. Numerous
studies have reported that somatization and
somatic symptoms are associated with
increased risk for exposure to traumatic
events and with occurrence and severity of
posttraumatic stress symptoms and disorders.
Many such studies are so hindered by the
methodological limitations described above,
however, that their conclusions may not be
justiﬁed from the data collected.
Two remarkable studies have surmounted
many of the methodological problems identi-
ﬁed in this research and in prospective research
designs, diagnostically assess disaster-exposed
compared with unexposed populations before
and after disaster. In the ﬁrst study, population
data on psychiatric disorders obtained a year
before the occurrence of torrential rains and
mudslides in Puerto Rico (43–45) were used
in a prospective examination of predisaster and
postdisaster somatoform symptoms in the
unexposed population compared with those of
the disaster-exposed group. Disaster exposure
was signiﬁcantly associated with development
of new, medically unexplained physical symp-
toms not present before the disaster, especially
gastrointestinal and pseudoneurological symp-
toms. The authors concluded that somatic
symptoms are “an important component of
the disaster-reactive psychopathological reper-
toire” [(45) p. 966] and represent “true out-
comes” [(44) p. 674] of the disaster. They
cautioned, however, that the magnitude of the
ﬁndings was very small (indicated by regression
slopes on the order of 0.05 to 0.07), allowing
for contribution of nonspeciﬁc effects such as
unsanitary conditions after the disaster (44).
In the second study, Robins, Smith,
Solomon and colleagues (46–48) conducted
a prospective analysis of somatoform symp-
toms in disaster survivors relative to an unex-
posed comparison group. The study was
conducted in association with a series of
disasters (radioactivity in well water, dioxin
contamination, floods, and tornadoes) in
Times Beach, Missouri, near St. Louis.
Serendipitously, predisaster psychiatric diag-
nosis data had been collected in the same
area just 1 year before the disasters as part of
the large Epidemiologic Catchment Area
study (49) of psychiatric disorders in the
general population. After the disasters,
Robins and colleagues (47) identified only
one case of somatization disorder—in the
unexposed comparison group, with onset
before the events of interest—and the rates
of somatization symptoms were not unusu-
ally high in this population. Somatization
symptoms were not more prevalent after the
disasters, and new symptoms had not devel-
oped. The study determined that the
disaster-exposed group differed from the
nonexposed group before the disaster and
had a higher prevalence of phobias, interper-
sonal problems, and poorer health, illustrat-
ing selection bias for disaster exposure based
on preexisting personal vulnerabilities. The
authors concluded that somatization was not
an observed outcome of the disasters because
the disaster-exposed group had only small
and clinically inconsequential changes.
Discussion and Conclusions
As discussed above, disasters in general repre-
sent the most pure form of traumatic events
for research on mental health effects of trau-
matic events because of less confounding
from selection bias for predisposing charac-
teristics that increase the odds for exposure to
traumatic events. Even this research, how-
ever, has serious potential methodological
pitfalls, including
• failure to exclude medical explanations for
the symptoms (contaminating the desired
somatization data with somatic symptoms
of medically based conditions, thereby over-
estimating somatization)
• spurious attribution of medically unex-
plained symptoms to medical causes by
somatizers, thus overlooking somatization
• failure to detect the majority of somatiza-
tion disorder cases in single-subject inter-
views
• lack of established validity of diagnostically
unrelated symptom report data
• failure to classify somatization following
speciﬁc events into new (incident) and pre-
existing categories
• inappropriate assumption of causal direc-
tionality from data merely identifying asso-
ciation.
Somatoform symptoms or disorders
present after a disaster must be interpreted
carefully to determine that they were either not
present before the disaster or, if they were, that
they were worse after the disaster. Studies have
generally failed to do this. The two studies
exercising the most methodological care in
examining these issues found little evidence of
clinically important new somatization after
disasters.
Robins (50) pointed out the importance
of searching for possible common antecedents
in stress research, allowing other potential
interpretations in more sophisticated models.
The simplest model involves straight-line
causal effects of a specific stressor leading
directly to a subsequent disorder. Robins
encouraged researchers to develop more com-
plex models with greater numbers of variables
to compete with other plausible explanations
for the association. In these alternative mod-
els, consideration of directionality may lead
to novel conclusions about causation. For
example, the occurrence of symptoms follow-
ing exposure to traumatic events might be
assumed to reflect causal effects of trauma.
Alternatively, other possible interpretations
might be that individuals with preexisting
psychiatric disorders will continue to exhibit
symptoms after the event as well, thus
accounting for the apparent association of
traumatic events and symptoms (illustrated
by the dotted line in Figure 1).
The complexity of the issues may be
magniﬁed in studies of traumatic events other
than disaster, with confounding that may
occur between preexisting symptoms and
traumatic events. Other variables associated
with psychiatric symptoms may increase
vulnerability for traumatic events, creating
indirect associations between symptoms and
traumatic events (illustrated in Figure 2).
Assumption of causal directionality from
the traumatic event to those symptoms may
be an incorrect interpretation of the data. For
example, one needs to consider that preexist-
ing somatoform disorders could increase the
actual risk for traumatic events or be associ-
ated through biased reporting of traumatic
event history, thus explaining the apparent













Figure 2. Second causal model of trauma and
psychopathology.association of traumatic events and somatiza-
tion symptoms indirectly based on the preex-
isting characteristics of these individuals.
Widom (51) thus recommended that future
studies control for confounding factors and
additional factors (e.g., dispositional attrib-
utes, environmental conditions, biological
predispositions, and positive events) that may
mediate mental health effects of traumatic
experiences.
Future research is encouraged to consider
the many methodological issues discussed
above in obtaining adequate data to address
questions about the association of psy-
chopathology such as somatization with trau-
matic events. These specific methodological
issues include
• appropriate choice of comparison groups
• satisfactory deﬁnition and measurement of
somatization
• exclusion of medical explanations for the
symptoms
• recognition of somatizers’ spurious attribu-
tion of symptoms to medical causes
• collection of data from additional sources
beyond single interviews of subjects
• validation of nondiagnostic symptom
reporting or reconsideration of symptoms
within diagnostic frameworks
• classiﬁcation of somatization after an event
into new (incident) and preexisting categories
• development of research models that
include sufficient variables to examine the
broader scope of potential relationships
• novel consideration of alternative causal
directionalities.
These modifications of research may
dramatically affect conclusions reached in
research studies investigating mental health
effects of exposure to trauma.
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